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A Practical Guide to Taking and
Defending Depositions
Gary S. Gildin*
One of the most important skills of trial advocacy is employed
outside the courtroom and well in advance of the inception of the
trial. While the effective advocate must be able to present the case to
the trier of fact in an understandable and persuasive fashion, it is
through pretrial discovery that counsel is afforded the opportunity to
learn of, as well as to limit, the actual evidence which credibly may
be offered at trial.' Because the script for the trial is authored before
any witness setsfoot in the courtroom, it is essential that the advo-
cate become a master in the art of discovery. This article explores
what is generally accepted as the most valuable, albeit the most ex-
pensive, discovery device-the deposition.2 Strategies and tactics for
* Associate Professor, The Dickinson School of Law. B.A. 1973, University of Wiscon-
sin; J.D. 1976, Stanford Law School. This article is an expanded version of a presentation for
the Pennsylvania Bar Institute, the outline of which previously has been published. Gildin &
Shrager, Strategies and Tactics in Deposition Practice, in How TO PREPARE FOR, TAKE &
USE DEPOSITIONS (Pennsylvania Bar Institute 1981) [hereinafter cited as Gildin & Shrager].
The author expresses his gratitude to Ann Targonski for her valuable assistance in research for
this article.
1. Depositions have the potential to serve many significant purposes beyond discovery. In
some jurisdictions, depositions may be taken prior to the commencement of an action to assist
in the preparation of pleadings. See, e.g., PA.R.CIv.P. 4001(c). Responses to deposition ques-
tions may be submitted in support of motions to dispose of litigation on the merits prior to
trial, FED.R.CIv.P. 32, 56(e), as well as offered into evidence at trial. FED.R.CIv.P. 32(a). In
fact, depositions may be taken specifically to perpetuate the testimony of witnesses who will be
unavailable at trial and thus generate evidence which otherwise could not be presented.
FED.R.CIv.P. 27, 32(a)(3). Finally, depositions may influence the means by which a vast ma-
jority of civil cases are disposed-settlement. Depositions not only allow the attorney to assess
the case on its merits by learning the relevant facts prior to trial, but also enable her to evalu-
ate the opposing party, witnesses and counsel. Similarly, the advocate may affect the opposing
party's evaluation of the case by her competence in taking and defending depositions.
2. Although the most useful single discovery tool, depositions are most effective when
they complement other methods of discovery. Because the various means of discovery may be
used in any order unless the court orders otherwise, FED.R.CIv.P. 26(d), counsel carefully
must plan the sequencing of discovery devices and the order in which individual depositions are
taken. See Sugarman & North, Introduction to Deposition Strategy, I DEPOSITION STRAT-
EGY, LAW AND FORMS § 1.02[2][f9 and [g] (1983) [hereinafter cited as Sugarman & North];
Gildin & Shrager, supra note*, at 19-21; Dallas, Effective Use of Interrogatories and Deposi-
tions: Some Practical Pointers, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 297, 304-305 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Dallas].
Notwithstanding the efficacy of depositions, counsel may elect not to depose a particular
witness for tactical reasons, see A. MORRILL, TRIAL DIPLOMACY, SELECTED TEXT § 12.7 (2d
taking and defending depositions in federal courts are examined in
the order in which they may be predicted to arise in the course of a
"typical" deposition.3
I. Stipulations About the Conduct of the Deposition
The conduct of depositions in federal court cases is governed by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure4 and any rules promulgated by
the district court and/or individual judge to whom the particular
case is assigned.5 As in any other aspect of pretrial or trial advocacy,
one must thoroughly understand the prescribed rules to be effective
in taking or defending a deposition. The first tactical decision which
is likely to be raised at the deposition, however, is unique to the dis-
covery process-whether to enter into a stipulation to modify the
pertinent rules.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 29 provides that "[ulnless the
court orders otherwise, the parties may by written stipulation (1)
provide that depositions may be taken . . . in any manner and when
so taken may be used like other depositions. . .. ,," At the outset of
the deposition, opposing counsel, or even the court reporter, may
suggest altering the federal rules by "the usual stipulations." Fre-
quently, an inexperienced attorney, fearful of appearing ignorant, re-
sponds by stating "of course," even though he is completely unaware
of the substance of the proposed stipulations. The appropriate reply
to any offer to conduct a deposition under the "usual stipulations" is,
"what specific stipulations are you proposing?"'
The two most significant stipulations typically sought are waiver
of the requirement that the deponent read and sign the transcript of
ed. 1979); Sugarman & North, supra § 1.02[2][61, or because the rules of procedure do not
authorize discovery by deposition. See, e.g., FED.R.CIv.P. 26 (b)(4)(A)(i)(persons whom the
adversary expects to call as an expert witness at trial may not be deposed absent court order).
3. This article does not address preparation for depositions. For a discussion of preparing
to take and defend depositions, see R. HAYDOCK & D. HERR, DISCOVERY PRACTICE §§ 3.4,
3.7.2 and 3.7.3 (1982)[hereinafter cited as R. HAYDOCK & D. HERR]; Sugarman & North,
supra note 2, at § 1.02[3]-[6]; Facher, Taking Depositions, 4 LITIGATION, Fall 1977 at 27, 28
[hereinafter cited as Facher]; Summit, Conducting the Oral Deposition, 1 LITIGATION, Spring
1975 at 22-24 [hereinafter cited as Summit]; Suplee, Depositions: Strategies. Tactics, Objec-
tives, Mechanics, and Problems, 2 REV. OF LITIGATION 255, 320-27 (1982)[hereinafter cited
as Suplee].
4. Although restricted to analysis of deposition practice in cases filed in federal court,
this article identifies tactics which may be considered in any jurisdiction. Of course, the perti-
nent rules of the particular jurisdiction must be consulted before taking or defending any
deposition.
5. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 authorizes each district court to create rules gov-
erning practice in the district, so long as those rules are not inconsistent with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. FED.R.CIv.P. 83.
6. FED.R.CIv.P. 29.
7. Acceptance of the "usual stipulations" arguably would fail to comply with the re-
quirement that any stipulation regarding discovery be written. FED.R.Civ.P. 29. Each stipula-
tion should be placed unambiguously on the record of the deposition. Porter v. Seas Shipping
Co., 20 F.R.D. 108 (S.D. N.Y. 1956).
the deposition8 and alteration of the rules that dictate which objec-
tions are waived if not lodged at the deposition.9 The strategies in-
volved in the latter stipulation will be analyzed in the course of the
discussion of objections.'"
The witness' general obligation to read and sign the transcript
of the deposition is set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
30(e) as follows:
When the testimony is fully transcribed the deposition shall be
submitted to the witness for examination and shall be read to or
by him, unless such examination and reading are waived by the
witness and by the parties. Any changes in form or substance
which the witness desires to make shall be entered upon the dep-
osition by the officer with a statement of the reasons given by
the witness for making them. The deposition shall then be
signed by the witness, unless the parties by stipulation waive the
signing or the witness is ill or cannot be found or refuses to sign.
If the deposition is not signed by the witness within 30 days of
its submission to him, the officer shall sign it and state on the
record the fact of the waiver or of the illness or absence of the
witness or the fact of the refusal to sign together with the rea-
son, if any, given therefor; and the deposition may then be used
as fully as though signed unless on a motion to suppress under
Rule 32(d)(4) the court holds that the reasons given for the re-
fusal to sign require rejection of the deposition in whole or in
part."
The party taking the deposition may profit by insisting that the de-
ponent read and sign the transcript. By requiring the witness to re-
view the transcript, the deposing counsel is assured of the accuracy
of both the testimony and the transcription. Additionally, the deposi-
tion may be used more effectively to impeach the deponent if his
trial testimony varies from his deposition answers. The witness not
only will be forced to concede that he was under oath at the time of
the deposition, but further will have to admit that he read the tran-
script of the deposition and affixed his signature only after finding it
to be a true and correct recording of his testimony.
Notwithstanding these advantages, more compelling reasons en-
courage the deposing party to seek a stipulation waiving the reading
and signing of the transcript.'" The deposition is the sole discovery
8. FED.R.Civ.P. 30(e).
9. FED.R.CIv.P. 32(d). Stipulations also may concern purely procedural matters, like
waiver of sealing or filing of the deposition. FED.R.CIv.P. 30(f)(1).
10. See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
II. FED.R.CIv.P. 30(e).
12. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e) requires an agreement by the deponent and
the parties to waive reading of the transcript, whereas waiver of signature may be accom-
plished by stipulation of the parties without the consent of the witness. FED.R.Civ.P. 30(e).
device capable of eliciting responses that are not initially screened by
counsel. This unique opportunity to obtain spontaneous answers may
be impaired drastically if the deponent is allowed to alter his deposi-
tion testimony in the course of reviewing the transcript. Rule 30(e)
does not restrict the deponent to correcting errors in transcription,
and the courts have placed virtually no substantive limits on the
changes that the witness is entitled to make. 8 Furthermore, the de-
ponent is not prohibited from conferring with counsel concerning re-
vision of his deposition responses." Although the original answers
remain on the transcript and are admissible in evidence,' 5 their util-
ity will be greatly diminished if the witness promptly disavowed
those responses upon his review of the transcript."0 For these reasons,
the attorney noticing the deposition generally should offer, and de-
fending counsel should refuse, a stipulation to waive the reading and
signature requirements of Rule 30(e).' 7
13. Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639, 641 (N.D. Il1. 1981) ("Rule 30(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allows deponents to make '[a]ny changes in form or substance which
the witness desires ... ,' even if the changes contradict the original answers or even if the
deponent's reasons for making the changes are unconvincing."); Allen & Company v. Occiden-
tal Petroleum Corp., 49 F.R.D. 337, 340 (S.D. N.Y. 1970)("The cases construing the Rule
[30(e)] are clear that the witness may make changes of any nature, no matter how fundamen-
tal or substantial."); Colin v. Thompson, 16 F.R.D. 194, 195 (W.D. Mo. 1954) ("Whether his
reasons are good or not will not impair his right to make the changes. ... ); De Seversky v.
Republic Aviation Corp., 2 F.R.D. 113, 115 (E.D. N.Y. 1941)("Nor, in my opinion, should
the witness be prevented from correcting his answers where he reasonably desires to do so
although his reasons given may seem inadequate"). If the changes to the transcript are sub-
stantial, the courts may permit the deposition to be re-opened at the expense of the party
making the changes. Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. at 642, Erstad v. Curtis Bay Towing Co.,
28 F.R.D. 583, 584 (D. Md. 1961); Colin v. Thompson, 16 F.R.D. at 195; De Seversky v.
Republic Aviation Corp., 2 F.R.D. at 115. But cf Allen & Company v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 49 F.R.D. at 341 (changes to deposition do not warrant further examination).
Although courts have not substantively restricted the right to amend deposition answers,
they have insisted upon strict compliance with the procedural requirements of Rule 30 (e).
Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. at 641 (changes made by witness on correction sheets appended
to transcript are inadequate); Sauder Industries, Inc. v. The Carborundum Co., 31
Fed.R.Serv.2d (Callaghan) 437, 441 (N.D. Ohio 1980)(Rule 30 (e) does not permit changes
by deponent after unsigned deposition has been certified for filing by court reporter); Architec-
tural League of New York v. Bartos, 404 F. Supp. 304, 311 n.7 (S.D. N.Y. 1975)(changes to
deposition made in witness' own hand and without a statement of reasons for the changes are
inoperative); Colin v. Thompson, 16 F.R.D. at 195 (deponent may not enter changes on tran-
script but must appear before the person who took the deposition to make changes in answers
and state reasons for changes). But cf. Allen & Company v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 49
F.R.D. at 340-41 ("substantial compliance" with requirement that changes be entered upon
the deposition by officer is adequate).
14. Erstad v. Curtis Bay Towing Co., 28 F.R.D. 583, 584 (D. Md. 1961).
15. Usiak v. New York Tank Barge Co., 299 F.2d 808, 810 (2nd Cir. 1962); Lugtig v.
Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639, 641-42 (N.D. Il. 1981); Sauder Industries, Inc. v. The Carborundum
Co., 31 FED.R.SERv.2d (CALLAGHAN) 437, 441 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Allen & Company v. Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp., 49 F.R.D. 337, 341 (S.D. N.Y. 1970).
16. At the request of the adverse party, the court may require the party offering the
original answers to introduce the amended answers as well. See FED.R.CIv.P. 32(a)(4);
FED.R.EvID. 106.
17. Different considerations are present when the deposition is taken to perpetuate the
favorable testimony of a witness who will be unavailable at trial. See FED.R.CIv.P. 27,
32(a)(3). Counsel taking the deposition may prefer to have the witness review and execute the
II. Examining the Deponent
A. The Introductory Litany
One of the goals in taking a deposition is to create a script from
which the witness cannot deviate at trial without being impeached.
To achieve this end, each deposition should commence with the fol-
lowing introductory litany:
Q. Mr. Sorenson, do you understand that you are under oath?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there anything which will prevent you from testifying
fully and accurately? 8
A. No.
Q. I want you to listen carefully to the questions which I ask
you, and answer only those questions which you hear fully. If
you do not hear a question, please tell me and I will repeat it.
Will you do that?
A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Sorenson, I also want you to answer only those ques-
tions which you completely understand. If you do not under-
stand a question, please let me know and I will try to rephrase
it. Will you promise to do so?
A. Yes.
Q. May I assume, then, that if you answer a question, you
have both heard and understood the question?
A. Yes."
These questions guarantee that the deponent may not credibly
repudiate his deposition answers at trial by asserting that he did not
testify truthfully or accurately or did not hear or understand a ques-
tion. If the witness attempts to explain an inconsistency between his
trial and deposition testimony by such a claim, he will be impeached
further by his responses to these prefatory questions.
B. The Substance and Structure of the Examination
The substance, as well as the structure, of the examination of
transcript to verify that it is accurate and thus bolster its weight in the eyes of the trier of fact.
Assuming the witness is not hostile, there is also little risk that he will substantially change the
answers given at the deposition upon reviewing the transcript.
It should be noted that waiver of signature will not entirely preclude a party from amend-
ing his deposition responses. See FED.R.CIv.P. 26(e), which sets forth circumstances under
which a party has a duty to supplement responses to discovery requests.
18. Blumenkopf, Deposition Strategy and Tactics, 5 AM.J.TRIAL ADVOC. 231, 242
(1981)[hereinafter cited as Blumenkopf].
19. One commentator suggests that at this point, defending counsel should interject for
the record that the witness may believe he comprehends a question when in fact he does not,
and therefore the fact that the witness answers is not a guarantee that he understood the
question. Suplee, supra note 3, at 287. If the defending attorney offers such remarks, the
examiner again should obtain assurances from the deponent that he will only answer questions
which he is certain that he understands.
the witness largely depends upon the purpose for which the particu-
lar deposition is taken. If the principal goal is discovery, counsel ob-
viously should strive to obtain all information which the deponent
knows about the subject matter of the cause of action.20 The deposi-
tion not only should elicit all favorable facts, but also should discover
every fact which tends to undermine the deposing party's claim or
defense. Only by learning the harmful facts in advance of trial can
counsel properly prepare to rebut or blunt those facts and to evaluate
the case intelligently for purposes of settlement.
The deposing party must not rest content with unearthing the
witness' knowledge of the events in issue. The record similarly should
reflect those matters about which the deponent does not know to en-
sure that he may not be offered as an adverse witness at trial to
testify about these facts. The deponent also should be asked to iden-
tify other witnesses and documents which may be relevant to the
case.
21
Finally, questioning should pin the witness to a specific factual
position which he must reiterate at trial. While at first blush this
appears to be at odds with the aim of comprehensive discovery, both
objectives can be achievqd through the proper sequencing of ques-
tions.22 Counsel should begin each area of inquiry with broad, gen-
eral questions designed to generate expansive narrative responses.23
The examination should continue with more narrowly focused ques-
tions geared not only to secure more complete answers, but also to
confine the witness' testimony to a very precise set of facts. Counsel
20. The permissible scope of discovery is set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b). Discovery is not limited to information which would be admissible at trial "if the infor-
mation sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
FED.R.CIv.P. 26(b)(1).
21. The deponent should be asked about the location and existence of relevant docu-
ments even if documents have been produced in advance of the deposition pursuant to a re-
quest for production under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34. The witness may identify docu-
ments which were not sought by or produced in response to an earlier request. Isom, A
Deposition Primer. Part I1: At the Deposition, 11 COLO. LAW. 1215, 1219 (1982)[hereinafter
cited as Isom]. If the witness does identify new documents, the examiner should demand pro-
duction prior to the final termination of the deposition so that she may interrogate the witness
about these documents. Any agreement to produce the documents should be placed on the
record of the deposition. R. HAYDOCK & D. HERR, supra note 3, at § 3.5.6 (1982).
22. As previously discussed, the introductory litany also binds the witness to his deposi-
tion testimony. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
23. The examiner further can encourage the witness to be responsive by adopting a
friendly, helpful demeanor, However, counsel at all times must maintain control over the wit-
ness by persisting in the examination until she is satisfied that the witness has offered complete
answers to her questions. The examiner also must make sure that defending counsel does not
interfere with the deposition by repeatedly conferring with the deponent before he answers. All
such conferences should be noted for the record, and after each conference, the witness should
be asked whether a) his answer differed because of what the attorney said, b) the attorney's
advice helped him answer and c) the attorney noted pitfalls in the question. Suplee, supra note
3, at 290. Similarly, following each recess, to deter any modification of testimony, the depo-
nent should be asked whether he conferred with counsel. R. HAYDOCK & D. HERR, supra note
3, at § 3.5.8.
should conclude the area of inquiry by plainly establishing that the
deponent's recollection has been exhausted fully, thus preventing him
from successfully departing from his deposition testimony at trial.
This sequence is exemplified by the following abbreviated excerpt
from the deposition of the plaintiff in a civil action for assault:
Q. Mr. Byron, please explain what happened on the corner of
Michigan and Main around 10:00 on the evening of Friday, Oc-
tober 3. [The sequence begins with an open-ended question call-
ing for an expansive narrative description of the events.]
A. I was standing on the corner waiting for the bus to take me
home from work. Pat Moran came up to me and started shout-
ing and pushing me. We fell to the ground, Moran started
punching me and then got up and ran away.
Q. Mr. Byron, let's focus first on what happened before the
pushing began. You stated that Mr. Moran began shouting at
you. Can you tell us exactly what he said? [The examiner fol-
lows-up to elicit a more detailed and thorough explanation of the
events preceding the alleged assault.]
A. Yes. Moran came up to me and said, "We don't need your
kind hanging around here anymore. Why don't you just move
on."
Q. Were those his exact words? [The witness is further pinned
to a very specific factual position.]
A. Yes.
Q. Is that everything which you recall that Mr. Moran said
before he began pushing you? [The inquiry into Moran's state-
ments preceding the alleged assault concludes by clearly estab-
lishing that the deponent's recollection is exhausted so that he
may not expand upon or deviate from his deposition testimony
at trial.]2"
A. Yes.
Even when the principal purpose of a deposition is discovery,
the deposing party must be alert for responses which may prove val-
uable at trial as admissions or impeachment.2" The likelihood of pro-
curing such testimony may be increased without a significant sacri-
fice in discovery if counsel jumps from topic to topic rather than
asking the deponent to relate his version of the facts in chronological
24. It has been suggested that, to close further any route by which the witness may
escape his deposition testimony at trial, the examiner should ask whether there are any docu-
ments which could refresh the witness' recollection. If the deponent responds affirmatively,
counsel should show him the document or continue the deposition until it is produced and
inquire whether it in fact has refreshed his recollection. Summit, supra note 3, at 26. Afford-
ing the witness a chance to refresh his recollection presents the risk that the witness will recall
facts that are damaging to the examiner. Thus the deposing party may prefer to accept the
witness' statement that he has no recollection of any other statement prior to the pushing and
use this response to impeach the witness if further statements are offered at trial.
25. FED.R.CIv.P. 32(a)(1) and (2).
order.26 The examiner must be willing to abandon an area of inquiry
before exhausting the witness' recollection if the deponent unexpect-
edly gives an answer which may serve as an important admission or
impeachment. This poses perhaps the toughest tactical decision for
the deposing attorney, who must weigh the benefits to be derived
from further questioning in the area against the risk that the witness
will destroy the admission or impeachment through subsequent re-
sponses. The advocate must make this choice instantly, for if she
unduly delays before asking the next question, the deponent or the
opposing counsel may be alerted to the damage and may take steps
to qualify or clarify the previous answer and thus assure that it will
be utterly useless at trial.
An entirely different approach to the examination is dictated
when the deposition is taken to perpetuate the testimony of a witness
who will be unavailable at trial.2" Unlike depositions intended princi-
pally for discovery, these depositions require the deposing party to
proffer only questions that narrowly elicit favorable facts which she
intends to introduce at trial.2" Because the deposing party intends to
offer the deposition into evidence in place of live testimony, the ex-
amination must be carefully structured in a logical sequence which
will be understandable to the trier of fact. Both the form of the ques-
tion and the answer must be proper, 29 and counsel meticulously must
26. Deviating from a chronological structure in fact may enhance discovery from the
witness who has been prepared thoroughly for his deposition, as he will be less able to testify
from his rehearsed script.
27. FED.R.Civ.P. 27, 32(a)(3). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a)(3) deems a wit-
ness unavailable for purposes of permitting the use of his testimony as substantive evidence
if the court finds: (A) that the witness is dead; or (B) that the witness is at a
greater distance than 100 miles from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of
the United States, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured
by the party offering the deposition; or (C) that the witness is unable to attend
or testify because of age, illness, infirmity or imprisonment; or (D) that the party
offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness
by subpoena; or (E) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circum-
stances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due re-
gard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open
court, to allow the deposition to be used.
FED.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(3); see also Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a), which defines when a wit-
ness is unavailable for purposes of using his deposition under the former testimony exception to
the hearsay rule. FED.R.EvID. 804(a),(b)(l).
28. As in discovery depositions, the examiner also may elect to establish the witness'
lack of knowledge about certain matters.
29. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(c) provides, in pertinent part, that
"[e]xamination and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed as permitted at the trial
under the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence." FED.R.CIv.P. 30 (c). The proper use
of leading questions at a deposition therefore is prescribed by Federal Rule of Evidence 611 (c)
as follows:
Leading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness
except as may be necessary to develop his testimony. Ordinarily leading ques-
tions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile
witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interro-
gation may be by leading questions.
establish any requisite foundation for the admissibility of the testi-
mony. As the witness will not be available at trial, there will be no
later opportunity to correct deficiencies in the deposition.
Different questioning tactics are utilized when the primary aim
of the deposition is to dispose of the litigation prior to trial. For ex-
ample, a witness may be deposed to generate evidence to support a
motion for summary judgment.8 0 In such instances, the examination
should be limited to establishing only those matters which are neces-
sary to support the motion. Counsel does not want to afford the wit-
ness an opportunity to explain his responses nor to elicit unfavorable
answers which could be used to demonstrate that material facts are
in dispute.31 Consequently, the questions must be painstakingly for-
mulated to invite only the desired responses. Similarly, depositions
may be used to induce termination of the litigation by settlement.
Such depositions should emulate an aggressive cross-examination
and are substantively limited to exposing the weaknesses in the ad-
versary's case.82
Regardless of the purpose of the deposition, the precise ques-
tions to be posed are determined by the legal and factual issues of
the case. While it is obviously not feasible here to catalogue the
questions to be asked in every type of case, 3 there is one important
line of inquiry which should be pursued in virtually every deposition.
The witness should be asked to describe all steps he took to prepare
for the deposition and to identify specifically each file and document
that he reviewed. ' The witness' response not only will enhance the
reliability of the deposition testimony if offered at trial, but may lead
to the production of evidence which was not and could not be ob-
tained through other means of discovery.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 612, an adverse party is enti-
tled to production and inspection of documents which the witness
FED.R.EvID. 611(c).
30. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) specifically authorizes the court to permit
depositions to be offered in support of, and in opposition to, motions for summary judgment.
FED.R.CIv.P. 56(e).
31.sp2n]Counsel may have to adopt a sterner demeanor to prevent an uncooperative wit-
ness from offering responses which are evasive or which go beyond the scope of the question.
32. Some attorneys attempt to maximize the chances of settlement by making the depo-
sition of a party so unpleasant that the witness will not want to repeat the experience at trial.
The use of this tactic is limited by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(c) and 30(d) as well as
by MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1) and 7-102(A)(1) and
EC 7-10 and 7-37 (1979). See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1, 4.4
(1983).
33. For an analysis of depositions in various substantive areas of law, see DANNER, PAT-
TERN DEPOSITION CHECKLISTS (1973 & Supp. 1983); 2-9 DEPOSITION STRATEGY LAW AND
FORMS (A. Sann and S. Bellman ed. 1983); THE ART OF TAKING AND USING DEPOSITIONS;
(Pennsylvania Bar Institute ed. 1981).
34. If the deposition is not completed in one day, at the beginning of each subsequent
session of the deposition, the witness should be asked to detail the preparation that was done
since the most recent adjournment. Summit, supra note 3, at 25.
consulted before trial to refresh his memory for the purpose of testi-
fying.3 5 Rule 612 has been extended to require production of docu-
ments reviewed by a witness in preparation for his deposition. 6 In-
deed, some courts have construed the rule even to compel disclosure
of privileged documents by reasoning that the privilege is waived
once the documents are used to assist in refreshing the deponent's
recollection."7 The operation of Rule 612 plainly instructs the exam-
ining counsel routinely to ask the witness to identify and produce all
documents reviewed in anticipation of the deposition. In turn, the
deponent's lawyer should avoid disclosing documents which are privi-
leged or which have not been requested through previous discovery
when preparing the witness for his deposition.38
C. Use of Documents at the Deposition
The deposition is an indispensable tool for the discovery of doc-
uments. Not only may the deponent be asked to divulge the exis-
tence, location and identity of relevant writings, but the deposition is
the lone means of compelling a nonparty to produce documentary
evidence prior to trial.3 9 The deposition also may lead to the inspec-
tion of records which otherwise would be privileged and, thus,
35. FED.R.EvID. 612.
36. FED.R.CIv.P. 30(c); Prucha v. M & N Modern Hydraulic Press Co., 76 F.R.D. 207
(W.D. Wisc. 1977). See infra note 36.
37. James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del. 1982); Ramsey v.
County of Fresno, 7 Fed.Evid.Rep. 950 (E.D. Cal. 1980); Marshall v. United States Postal
Service, 88 F.R.D. 348, 350-51 (D.D.C. 1980)(use of privileged document to refresh recollec-
tion at the deposition requires disclosure to opposing counsel, but does not constitute any-
further waiver of privilege); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Underwriters Laboratories,
Inc., 81 F.R.D. 8 (N.D. II1. 1978).
In Cambridge Industrial Products Corp. v. Metal Works, Ltd., 4 Fed.Evid.Rep. 835 (D.
Mass. 1979) and Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D. N.Y. 1977),
the courts refused to compel production of privileged documents used to refresh a deponent's
recollection. Both courts noted that their decisions were premised largely on the fact that there
was no clear prior case law that would have apprised the attorneys of the risk of waiving the
work-product privilege and cautioned that, in future cases, they would be willing to find the
privilege waived when the documents were used to refresh a deponent's recollection.
Contra Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Industries, Inc., 553 F.Supp. 45 (S.D.
N.Y. 1982)(refusing to order disclosure of work product used to refresh deponent's recollec-
tion); Al-Rowaishan Establishment v. Beatrice Foods Co., 92 F.R.D. 779 (S.D. N.Y. 1982)
(refusing to order disclosure of documents which contain solely the mental impressions of an
attorney relating to pending litigation); Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Muller & Phipps (Hawaii)
Ltd., 85 F.R.D. 118, 120 n.2 (W.D. Mo. 1980)(dictum).
38. Barrer v. Women's National Bank, 96 F.R.D. 202, 204 n.l (D.D.C. 1982)("Counsel
can adequately protect the attorney-client privilege by not making such a document available
for perusal by a client to prepare for a forthcoming deposition").
39. Documents may be obtained from a nonparty through service of a subpoena duces
tecum commanding the witness to produce specified documents at the deposition.
FED.R.Civ.P. 30(a) and (b)(1), 45. While a party also may be required to produce documents
at a deposition, see FED.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(5), one can compel a party to produce documents
without a formal deposition through a request for production of documents under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 34. FED.R.CIv.P. 34.
shielded from discovery. 0
Interestingly, while depositions may be instrumental in procur-
ing documents, documents play an integral role in the preparation
for and conduct of depositions. Whenever possible, counsel should
secure all relevant documents before taking depositions." Review of
these papers supplies background facts and suggests topics to be ex-
plored at the deposition. The documents themselves are likely to be
the subject of many questions,'2 as the deposition often affords the
sole opportunity prior to trial to compel a witness to explain or to
interpret a writing. Documents also can be used at the deposition to
induce forthright responses from a witness who persists in providing
evasive answers or who repeatedly claims a failure of recollection.43
Finally, only by reviewing documents in advance of the deposition is
the examiner equipped to recognize when the deponent's testimony is
contradicted by documentary evidence. Counsel then must decide
whether to confront the witness with the conflicting document in an
40. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
41. Documents readily may be acquired from a party in advance of his deposition by
filing a request for production of documents pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34,
which sets a date for inspection of documents that precedes the time of the deposition set forth
in the notice of deposition. FED.R.Civ.P. 34. However, the only means authorized by the fed-
eral rules to obtain documents from a nonparty is through a subpoena duces tecum which
commands production at the deposition. FED.R.Civ.P. 30(a) and (b)(1), 45. Nevertheless, a
nonparty may be persuaded to produce documents in advance of the deposition if it is ex-
plained that earlier production will spare the witness from waiting at the deposition while
counsel reviews the documents. If this appeal to the convenience of the deponent fails, counsel
can issue the subpoena duces tecum to the custodian of documents, limit the deposition of the
custodian to identification and authentication of the documents produced and subsequently
depose witnesses who have personal knowledge of the contents of the documents. Sugarman &
North, supra note 2, at § 1.02[7]. Of course, this procedure will afford an advance review of
documents only if the custodian of documents is not the individual who possesses personal
knowledge of the substance of the documents.
42. One commentator recommends that the witness should be asked the following about
each document he authored or distributed:
I. Who drafted the document?
2. Identify all persons from whom information contained in the document was received.
3. How many drafts of the document were prepared?
4. Who has custody of the drafts of the document?
5. Who reviewed the document before it was distributed?
6. Identify all persons who received copies of the document.
7. Identify all oral and written responses to the document or copies of the document.
Suplee, supra note 3, at 303.
Suplee also suggests that the following questions should be posed for each document re-
ceived by the witness:
1. What response, written or oral, did you make to the document?
2. If you made no response, why not?
3. To whom did you show the document?
4. Whom did you consult about the contents of the document?
5. What action was taken in response to the document?
Id.
43. The benefit of this use of documents at the deposition is aptly summarized in Dallas,
supra note 2, at 308: "If the examiner is able to employ this technique to trap the witness on
enough occasions, the witness may soon conclude that the examiner has documents to establish
every question. At that point, the examiner may be able to ask, even without documentary
support, questions that elicit crucial admissions."
effort to prevail upon him to retract the answer or to abandon the
line of questioning and spring the impeaching document upon the
hopefully unsuspecting witness at trial.
While there are no formal rules prescribing the handling and
use of documents at depositions, as a tactical matter, one should ad-
here to two general precepts. First, every document referred to at the
deposition should be marked for identification (for example, Brown
Deposition Exhibit A) and annexed to the transcript of the deposi-
tion."" The deposing party thereby averts any dispute at trial over
which document formed the basis of the deposition testimony.4 5 Sec-
ond, the examining counsel should attempt to have the witness estab-
lish the proper foundation4 for the admissibility of each document
used at the deposition. While this is not a condition which must be
satisfied before questioning the deponent about the document,47 the
deposition presents an important opportunity to learn whether the
witness in fact is competent to lay the foundation. If the witness
fully testifies to the foundation, the deposing party has discovered a
means of offering the exhibit into evidence at trial.48 Moreover, op-
posing counsel will be more inclined to stipulate to the admissibility
of the document, which will obviate the need to call any witness to
sponsor the document. Conversely, if the witness cannot supply the
foundation, the examiner is alerted in advance of trial that he must
find other ways to meet the evidentiary requisites. Opposing. counsel
also may neglect to object to the failure to establish a proper founda-
tion and thus preempt any such objection at trial.49
III. Objections
A. Rules of Procedure Relating to Objections
To raise or respond to objections competently, one must have an
absolute command of the applicable rules. The Federal Rules of
44. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(f)(1) expressly authorizes a party to request that
documents produced during the examination be marked for identification and annexed to the
deposition. Rule 30(f)(1) also details the circumstances under which the person producing the
documents may retain the originals. FED.R.CIv.P. 30(f)(1).
45. To eliminate any ambiguity concerning multipage exhibits, the examiner should
identify specifically the page of the exhibit to which his question pertains. Dombroff, Effective
Discovery Techniques and Tactics under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, BARRISTER,
Winter 1982, at 31, 34.
46. To be admissible at trial, a document must be properly authenticated and identified,
FED.R.EvID. 901-903; must be an original or satisfy one of the exceptions to the requirement
of an original, FED.R.EvID. 1001-1008; if hearsay, must fall within one of the hearsay excep-
tions, FED.R.EvID. 801-806; must be relevant, FED.R.EvID. 401-411; and must not be privi-
leged, FED.R.EvID. 501.
47. FED.R.Civ.P. 26 (b)(1), 30(c); see infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
48. If the deponent is a party or is unavailable at trial, the deposition transcript itself
may be offered as the foundation for the admission of the exhibit into evidence. FED.R.Civ.P.
32(a)(2) and (3).
49. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
Civil Procedure lump the available objections into categories organ-
ized according to the point in time at which the objection must be
raised to avoid waiver.50 Objections to the conduct of the examina-
tion of the deponent51 are regulated by Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 32(d)(3), which provides in pertinent part as follows:
(A) Objections to the competency of a witness or to the com-
petency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony are not waived
by failure to make them before or during the taking of the depo-
sition, unless the ground of the objection is one which might
have been obviated or removed if presented at that time.
(B) Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination
in the manner of taking the deposition, in the form of the ques-
tions5 or answers,53 in the oath or affirmation, or in the conduct
of parties, and errors of any kind which might be obviated, re-
moved, or cured if promptly presented, are waived unless season-
able objection thereto is made at the taking of the deposition. 4
Some counsel mistakenly believe that while objections to form
are waived unless raised at the deposition, all objections to relevance
are preserved for trial. A close reading of Rule 32(d)(3) plainly indi-
cates that an objection to competency, relevancy and materiality in-
deed may be waived if the basis for the objection could have been
"obviated" if lodged at the deposition. Accordingly, courts have re-
fused to entertain trial objections to the authenticity of exhibits, 55 to
the qualification of expert witnesses56 and to opinion testimony pre-
mised on hearsay57 by finding that such objections are "obviable"
50. FED.R.Civ.P. 32(d). These rules may be modified by written stipulation of the par-
ties. FED.R.Civ.P. 29; see infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
5i. The federal rules also specify the time and manner of objecting to the notice of the
deposition, FED.R.CIv.P. 32(d)(1); to the alleged disqualification of the officer before whom
the deposition is to be taken, FED.R.Civ.P. 32(d)(2); to the completion and return of the
deposition, FED.R.Civ.P. 32(d)(4); and to the form of written questions submitted for a depo-
sition upon written questions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 31. FED.R.Civ.P.
32(d)(3)(c).
52. Objections to form may include objections to questions which are improperly lead-
ing, Oberlin v. Marlin American Corp., 596 F.2d 1322, 1328 (7th Cir. 1979)(failure to object
to leading questions during the examination of the deponent by his own counsel waives the
objection); Elyria-Lorain Broadcasting Co. v. Lorain Journal Co., 298 F.2d 356, 360 (6th Cir.
1961); Houser v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 202 F. Supp. 181, 187-88 (D. Md. 1962); see
FED.R.CIv.P. 30(c); FED.R.EvID. 611(c); questions which are argumentative, Bahamas Agri-
culture Industries, Ltd. v. Riley Stoker Corp., 526 F.2d 1174, 1180-81 (6th Cir. 1975); and
questions which are misleading, ambiguous, compound or lacking a proper foundation.
Sugarman and North, supra note 2, at § 1.0414][c].
53. The examiner must be alert to object to answers which are nonresponsive, beyond
the scope of the question, speculative or otherwise defective in form to avoid waiving an objec-
tion to the answers. Kirschner v. Broadhead, 671 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1981).
54. FED.R.Civ.P. 32(d)(3)(A) and (B).
55. Gore v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 256 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1966), modified, 378
F.2d 584 (3rd Cir. 1967).
56. Cordle v. Allied Chemical Corp., 309 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1962).
57. Bahamas Agricultural Industries, Ltd. v. Riley Stoker Corp., 526 F.2d 1174 (6th
Cir. 1975); Cordle v. Allied Chemical Corp., 309 F.2d 821, 825-26 (6th Cir. 1962); Dudding
and therefore waived by counsel's failure to interject at the deposi-
tion. Thus, any objection that possibly could be cured, whether it
addresses the form or the substance of the question or answer, is
waived unless timely presented at the taking of the deposition."
B. Strategies in Raising Objections
As at the trial of the action, the attorney defending the deposi-
tion must consider whether an objection is tactically wise as well as
legally permissible. Thus, defending counsel may elect to forego a
waivable objection if the examiner, by curing the objection, will ob-
tain more comprehensive information from the witness. Indeed, the
deposing party may infer that the objection would not have been
made unless he was entering a productive area of examination. Con-
sequently, the defending attorney always must balance the need to
preserve an objection against the risk that raising the objection will
lead to more thorough discovery. 9 Conversely, the defending lawyer
may object, even if an objection is not necessary to avoid waiver, to
establish on the record a reminder to object at trial, to attempt to
prompt settlement by demonstrating evidentiary obstacles to the op-
ponent's case" or to induce the examiner to abandon the line of
questioning."
In addition to making objections, under limited circumstances
the defending attorney may instruct the witness not to answer an
objectionable question."2 Generally, the deponent is required to re-
spond to all questions, even those to which an objection has been
raised.' a Although some courts have sanctioned refusals to answer
questions which are unquestionably irrelevant,64 the majority of ju-
v. Thorpe, 47 F.R.D. 565 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
58. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(d)(3)(A) provides that an obviable
relevance objection is waived unless interposed at the deposition, Kirschner v. Broadhead, 671
F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1982), some courts have sustained relevance objections to deposition testi-
mony that are raised for the first time at trial on the ground that Federal Rule of Evidence
402 permits only the admission of relevant evidence. Reeg v. Shaughnessy, 570 F.2d 309 (10th
Cir. 1978); Sims Consolidated, Ltd. v. Irrigation and Power Equipment, Inc., 518 F.2d 413,
418 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975).
59. Dallas, supra note 2, at 309.
60. Isom, supra note 20, at 1218.
61. The propriety of this tactic is limited by the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2), EC 7-4 and 7-25 (1979). See also MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.1 and comment (1983).
62. If counsel does not represent the witness, he may suggest that the witness refuse to
answer a question, but is not entitled to instruct the witness not to respond. Shapiro v. Free-
man, 38 F.R.D. 308, 312 (S.D. N.Y. 1965).
63. FED.R.CIv.P. 30 (c).
64. Kamens v. Horizon Corp., 81 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. N.Y. 1979). On occasion, courts
have approved refusals to answer questions which are ambiguous, Mortensen v. Honduras
Shipping Co., 18 F.R.D. 510, 512 (S.D. N.Y. 1955); questions which are repetitious, mislead-
ing and argumentative, In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 83 F.R.D. 132, 134-35
(N.D. II1. 1979); Keough v. Pearson, 35 F.R.D. 20, 22-23 (D.D.C. 1964); and questions which
call for information outside the deponent's personal knowledge, In re Folding Carton Antitrust
risdictions hold that counsel may not instruct a witness to refuse to
answer a question on the ground that it is not relevant.65 However,
one may, in fact must, advise his client not to answer a question
which invades a privilege.66 Not only is privileged material outside
the scope of discovery, 67 but by responding to the question the wit-
ness would waive the privilege."
Even though the right to instruct the witness to refuse to answer
is severely constricted, one is not impotent to curtail an improper
examination. While the court normally does not rule upon until trial,
the defending counsel is entitled to suspend a deposition and move
the court to terminate or limit the examination on the ground that it
is being conducted "in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably
to annoy, embarrass or oppress the deponent or party." 69 Motions to
terminate have been granted when the examiner sought information
which was entirely irrelevant, 0 when there was repeated inquiry into
privileged matters71 and when the deposition in fact was oppressive
or embarrassing to the witness . 2 The court has the discretion to ter-
minate the deposition completely or, less dramatically, to limit the
scope and manner of conducting the deposition. 8 If the court denies
the motion, however, the defending attorney and/or his client may
be required to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,
incurred by the party opposing the motion.
74
Litigation, 83 F.R.D. 132 (N.D. Il1. 1979). See R. HAYDOCK & D. HERR, supra note 2, at §
3.7.5.
65. Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d 967, 973-74 (4th Cir. 1977); Preyer v.
United States Lines, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1973), affid, 546 F.2d 418 (3rd Cir. 1976);
United States v. IBM, 79 F.R.D. 378 (S.D. N.Y. 1978); Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 74
F.R.D. 518, 520-21 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 80, 83-
84 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Shapiro v. Freeman, 38 F.R.D. 308, 311-12 (S.D. N.Y. 1965); Drew v.
International Bd. of Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers, 37 F.R.D. 446, 449-50 (D.D.C. 1965);
Banco Nacional de Credito Ejidal, S.A. v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn.,
11 F.R.D. 497 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
66. Preyer v. United States Lines, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 546 F.2d
418 (3rd Cir. 1976); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 80, 85 (W.D. Okla.
1977); Lewis v. United Lines Transport Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
67. FED.R.CIv.P. 26 (b)(l).
68. Perrigon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 459 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Rosen-
field v. Unger, 25 F.R.D. 340 (S.D. Iowa 1960).
69. FED.R.Civ.P. 30(d). The motion may be presented either to the court in which the
action is pending or to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. Id. Counsel
also may petition the court to limit the scope of the deposition in advance of the deposition
through a motion for a protective order, FED.R.Civ.P. 26(c), as well as through a motion for a
discovery conference, FED.R.CIv.P. 26(0.
70. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Allied Chemical Alkali Workers of America, 11
F.R.D. 518 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
71. Ross v. Cities Services Gas Co., 21 F.R.D. 34 (W.D. Mo. 1957); Broadbent v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 5 F.R.D. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1946); French v. Zelstem-Zalessky, I
F.R.D. 508 (S.D. N.Y. 1940).
72. De Wagenknecht v. Stinnes, 243 F.2d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
73. FED.R.CIv.P. 30(d). If the court terminates the deposition, the deposition may be
resumed only upon the order of the court in which the action is pending. Id.
74. FED.R.CIv.P. 30(d), 37(a)(4).
C. Responding to Objections
The key to responding to objections lies in the recognition that,
except for claims of privilege, an objection does not authorize the
deponent to refuse to answer, but merely preserves that objection for
trial.7 5 Because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(c) provides that
objections should not interfere with the taking of evidence at the
deposition, the principal tactical decision for the examining counsel
is whether to attempt to cure an objection to ensure that the depo-
nent's response may be used at trial.
If the deposing party does not foresee offering the witness' reply
to a particular question at trial, her response to any objection is
quite simple. She should merely ask the witness to answer. The ex-
aminer never should abandon the question, since the objection gener-
ally will not support a refusal to answer.7 6 Similarly, there is no rea-
son for the examining counsel to argue about the objection when she
is indifferent to whether the objection will preclude her from submit-
ting the answer at trial.
In cases in which the party taking the deposition does wish to
preserve her option to use the deponent's response at trial, she first
must ascertain the basis for the objection. Her reaction then will de-
pend upon whether the objection is one which may be remedied at
the deposition. If the objection is curable, the examiner should en-
deavor to satisfy opposing counsel by rephrasing the question or by
taking other steps to correct the grounds for the objection.7 7 Con-
versely, if the objection is not obviable, the witness simply should be
asked to answer the question. Again, there usually is no cause to
quibble over the objection because it will not be resolved until trial
and should not impede the taking of evidence at the deposition.
Counsel particularly should avoid responding to relevance objections
by describing the purpose of her question.7 8 By explaining the rele-
vance of her questions, the deposing party invites continued objec-
tions as the defending counsel will realize that, by objecting, he will
be rewarded with discovery of the examiner's case.
Different strategies are implicated when the defending attorney
not only objects but improperly instructs the witness not to answer.
79
75. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
76. Id. The witness is entitled to decline to answer on the ground of privilege. See supra
notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
77. One author recommends that the examiner should ask the witness to answer the
initial question before attempting to cure the objection. Isom, supra note 20, at 1218.
78. If the witness refuses to answer and counsel intends to present a motion to compel
the answer, she may have to explain the relevance of the question to demonstrate a good-faith
effort to resolve the objection. See United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania Rules of Court, Rule 402.6.
79. If the deponent is not a party, the opposing counsel should be advised that he has no
right to instruct a witness not to answer unless he represents the witness. Shapiro v. Freeman,
Assuming that counsel cannot be persuaded that the refusal to an-
swer is not authorized, the deposing party has four options:80
1. The examiner may proceed with the interrogation and ask
the same question, in a slightly different form, later in the deposi-
tion. Often the defending attorney will not repeat the objection, ei-
ther because he does not recognize that it is substantially the same
question which he counselled the witness not to answer, or because
he no longer cares to object.
2. The examiner may complete the deposition and, prior to its
termination, negotiate all the refusals to answer. Once confronted
with the number of times he directed the witness not to answer, the
defending counsel may be willing to retract some of those instruc-
tions to avoid a motion to compel the answers and accompanying
sanctions. 81 Moreover, the deposing party obtains immediate re-
sponses without the delay or costs attendant to formal court
intervention.
3. The examiner may complete the deposition and, following
its termination, file a motion to compel the witness to answer.82
4. Rather than complete the deposition, the examiner may sus-
pend the deposition and seek a motion to compel the witness to an-
swer.83 Arguably the most effective means of inducing rescission of
an instruction not to answer is to suspend the deposition to seek an
immediate ruling from the judge. Counsel may present his motion in
person or even by telephone to the judge to whom the case is as-
38 F.R.D. 308, 312 (S.D. N.Y. 1965). The defending attorney then should be asked pointedly
to state for the record whether he represents the deponent. If counsel does not acknowledge
that he has been retained to defend the witness, there no longer is any justification for the
instruction. On the other hand, if counsel affirms that he represents the deponent, the examiner
may use this representation to impeach the credibility of the witness at trial.
The opposing counsel may suggest, rather than instruct, that a nonparty witness not an-
swer a question. If the witness declines to answer, the examiner should apprise the witness that
the deposition may need to be reconvened at a subsequent date. The specter of spending more
time away from their usual affairs typically induces most disinterested witnesses to respond.
80. In all cases, the examiner should have the court reporter mark the stenographic tape
in a manner which will enable the reporter readily to access the refusal to answer before the
deposition is transcribed. Counsel thus will be able accurately to apprise the court of the spe-
cific refusal to answer without awaiting a transcript of the deposition.
81. FED.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4) provides that if a motion to compel is granted,
the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent
whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses
incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds
that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other circum-
stances make an award of expenses unjust.
82. FED.R.CIv.P. 37(a). If the deponent is a party, the motion may be submitted to the
court before which the action is pending or to the court in the district in which the deposition
is taken. FED.R.CIv.P. 37(a)(1). However, if counsel seeks to compel a nonparty to answer a
question, the motion must be made to the court in the district in which the deposition is taken.
Id.
83. FED.R.CIv.P. 37(a).
signed or to the emergency judge on duty.4 This tactic not only
achieves a prompt resolution of the objection, but also the imminent
threat of an adverse ruling commonly impels defending counsel to
permit the witness to respond.85
D. Stipulations to Modify the Rules Relating to Objections
In addition to comprehending the way in which the federal rules
affect the raising of and response to objections at the deposition,
both the persons taking and defending the deposition must consider
whether to modify those rules by stipulation. 6 As with most aspects
of deposition practice, the purpose of the individual deposition influ-
ences which stipulations each party should favor.
If the foremost objective of the deposition is discovery rather
than generating evidence for trial, the deposing party should strive to
limit his adversary's opportunities to interfere with the interrogation.
Accordingly, the attorney taking the deposition may offer to stipu-
late that all objections are preserved for trial, thus precluding any
basis for objecting at the deposition. The examiner, however, does
have some incentive to require objections to be presented at the dep-
osition.8 7 Even if taken principally for discovery, the deposition unex-
pectedly may beget responses which may be used at trial for im-
peachment or as substantive evidence.88 The deposing attorney wants
to ensure that these answers will be admissible at trial absent an
objection at the deposition.8 9 Given these competing considerations,
the appropriate stipulation rests upon an assessment of the likelihood
of the defending counsel's obstructing discovery through excessive
objections versus the probability that the deponent's testimony will
be employed at trial.
The attorney defending the deposition must avoid the tempta-
tion to accept a stipulation that all objections are preserved for trial.
While alluring because it guards against inadvertent waiver of objec-
tions, the stipulation also disarms the defending party's most potent
84. Braziller v. Lind, 32 F.R.D. 367 (S.D. N.Y. 1963); see United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4. If counsel immediately
petitions the judge to compel an answer, the judge's ruling should be placed on the deposition
record.
85. If it is anticipated that the defending attorney repeatedly will instruct the witness
not to answer, the examiner may seek an order barring such future instructions, United States
v. IBM, 79 F.R.D. 378 (S.D. N.Y. 1978), or may apply to have a master appointed to preside
over the deposition. FED.R.Civ.P. 53; Shapiro v. Freeman, 38 F.R.D. 308, 312 (S.D.
N.Y)(fees of the master to be paid by the objecting attorney without reimbursement by his
client). The deposing party also may ask the court to rule upon the proper scope of discovery
in advance of a deposition through a motion for protective order, FED.R.CIv.P. 26(c), or a
motion for a discovery conference, FED.R.CIv.P. 26(f).
86. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
88. FED.R.CIv.P. 32(a)(1) and (2).
89. Blumenkopf, supra note 18, at 240.
weapon for controlling the deposition and protecting the witness. The
defending attorney, however, ordinarily should be willing to enter
into a stipulation preserving all objections except as to the form of
the question to avoid unintentional waiver of relevance objections
which the court ultimately deems obviable if raised at the
deposition. °
Different strategies are needed if the deposition is taken to per-
petuate the testimony of a witness who will be unavailable at trial.9"
Because the deposition will be the sole source of the witness' testi-
mony at trial, the deposing counsel wants to be alerted to and to
resolve all objections prior to terminating the deposition. Therefore,
one should seek a stipulation that all objections not offered at the
deposition are waived. Conversely, the defending counsel prefers to
preserve objections for trial, knowing that if an objection ultimately
is sustained, his adversary can offer no substitute for the deposition
testimony. Given that the defending party is unlikely to accede to a
stipulation requiring all objections to be presented at the deposition,
the attorney taking a deposition to perpetuate testimony should seek
a court order in advance of the deposition which provides that any
objection not raised at the deposition will be waived.92
IV. Examination of the Witness by the Attorney Defending the
Deposition
The attorney defending the deposition must determine whether,
and to what extent, to exercise his right to examine the deponent.9
This decision rests largely, although not exclusively, on the nature of
his relationship with the deponent.
If the deponent is counsel's client or a friendly or neutral wit-
ness who voluntarily will cooperate, as a general rule counsel should
not examine at the deposition. When the deposing party has exposed
only facts which harm his case, the defending attorney may be
tempted to question the witness to elicit favorable facts for the rec-
ord. Such an examination is entirely unnecessary when the witness is
willing to supply this information to the defending counsel outside
the deposition chamber. The helpful testimony may be presented
fully at trial, unimpaired by the defending counsel's failure to ques-
tion the witness about these matters at his deposition. 4 By examin-
ing the witness at the deposition, defending counsel gratuitously sup-
90. Facher, supra note 3, at 29; see supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
91. FED.R.Civ.P. 27, 32(a)(3).
92. FED.R.CIv.P. 26(c)(2).
93. The form of the questions properly employed by the defending attorney during his
examination is determined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e). See supra note 28.
94. Similarly, the testimony may be offered in support of pretrial motions, like motions
for summary judgment, through an affidavit of the witness. See FED.R.CIv.P. 56.
plies the discovery which the deposing party neglected to seek.
Beyond acquiring the testimony elicited by defending counsel, the
deposing attorney most assuredly will probe the new facts brought
forth on cross-examination through an extensive redirect
examination.
There are, however, two circumstances when a party or friendly
witness should be questioned. First, if there is any risk that the depo-
nent will be unavailable9 at trial, counsel should examine to the ex-
tent necessary to adduce favorable testimony for ultimate use at
trial. Second, defending counsel should interrogate the witness to re-
solve ambiguities in the direct testimony if counsel is confident that
the ambiguities may prove detrimental at trial and that the deponent
will clarify in a manner which helps, rather than further hurts, his
case. Although the ambiguities could be elucidated at trial, the ex-
planation will be more credible if first presented at the deposition.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a)(4) specifically prescribes that
"[i]f only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an
adverse party may require him to introduce any other part which
ought in fairness to be considered with the part introduced. . .. "0"
To invoke this rule of completeness at trial, the defending counsel
must unravel the ambiguities during the deposition.
The extent of the defending attorney's examination should differ
markedly if the deponent is affiliated with the adversary or for any
reason will not voluntarily cooperate. In such cases, the deposition
affords the only opportunity to interview the witness before trial.
Consequently, the defending counsel should examine as fully as if he
had noticed the deposition.'7 The defending attorney is not limited in
questioning by the scope of the direct examination,"8 although he
may have to bear a share of the costs of the deposition if his interro-
gation becomes extensive.9'
V. Conclusion
Virtually all the strategies in deposition practice are products of
two factors-the formal rules governing depositions and the purpose
or purposes for which the particular deposition is taken. While this
article does not pretend to comprehensively survey deposition tactics,
counsel should be able to deduce the appropriate techniques to be
95. See supra note 26.
96. FED.R.CIv.P. 32(a)(4); see also FED.R.EvID. 106.
97. See supra notes 19-38 and accompanying text.
98. Spray Products, Inc. v. Strouse, Inc., 31 F.R.D. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
99. Baron v. Leo Feist, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 71, 72 (S.D. N.Y. 1946); R. HAYDOCK & D.
HERR, supra note 3, at § 3.7.7.
employed in any deposition situation by analyzing the applicable
rules and her goals in taking or defending the deposition.
